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Leave Bad Enough Alonet
GARY J. SIMSON*

I am not, to say the least, a big fan of the Restatement (Second)ofConflict ofLaws
("Second Restatement').' I have even less enthusiasm, though, for the prospect of a
third restatement. After setting out briefly some of my misgivings about the Second
Restatement, I will explain why I do not welcome the possibility of a new one. On a
more positive note, I will then outline an approach that I believe would promote
sound decisionmaking under the Second Restatement.
Although the Second Restatement covers jurisdiction, judgments, and choice of
law, I assume that the case for a third restatement turns on the desirability of
developing a new set of provisions on choice of law. Choice of law is the Second
Restatement'sprimary concern. Moreover, since, under current Supreme Court case
law, constitutional limitations on state policymaking are much more substantial in the
jurisdiction andjudgments areas than in choice of law,2 choice of law also would only
sensibly be any new restatement's primary concern. I therefore will limit my remarks
here to choice of law. Also, in light of the editors' request that the commentaries in
this Symposium be brief, I will paint with a rather broad brush.
I. A VERY

QUALIFIED SUCCESS

By far the most important contribution of the Second Restatementis that, as stated
in its introduction,3 it "supersedes entirely" the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws ("FirstRestatement").4 By 1969, when the American Law Institute approved
the Second Restatement, the FirstRestatement and its place-of-wrong, place-ofmaking, and other territorial rules were already sufficiently battered by academic and
judicial criticisms that this official displacement hardly qualified as a bold gesture.5
Nonetheless, it was an important step forward, and there can be little doubt that it
helped accelerate courts' movement away from the FirstRestatementtomore modern
approaches.

t Copyright 2000 by Gary J. Simson.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I am grateful to Stephen Garvey and Rosalind Simson for various helpful suggestions.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].

2. For discussion of constitutional limitations in the jurisdiction, judgments, and choiceof-law areas under current Supreme Court case law, see, respectively, KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
CIvIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 51-78 (1999); William L.

Reynolds, The Iron Law ofFullFaithandCredit,53 MD. L.REv. 412 (1994); GeneR. Shreve,
Choice ofLaw and the ForgivingConstitution,71 IND. L.J. 271 (1996). For the view that the
Supreme Court should seriously revise its thinking about constitutional limitations on choice

of law, see Gary J. Simson, State Autonomy in Choice ofLaw: A Suggested Approach, 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 61 (1978).
3. Herbert Wechsler, Introductionto SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at vii.
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].
5. See GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND

MATERIALS 13-14 (3d ed. 1997).
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This addition by subtraction, however, could have been accomplished just as well
simply by a repeal of the FirstRestatement. The question therefore remains whether
the Second Restatementas an affirmative decisionmaking model makes a substantial
contribution to choice of law, and on that score, I have serious doubts.
The most-significant-relationship test stated as a "general principle" at the start of
the Second Restatement's chapters on torts and contracts ' can be quite problematic.
Judges relatively unsophisticated about choice oflaw or eager not to spend much time
on it commonly seize on the test's list of relevant contacts and pay little or no
attention to the test's admonition to consider the contacts in light of the choice-of-law
policies articulated in section 6." Judges who go beyond such contact-counting and
delve seriously into the realm of section 6 often find themselves hopelessly adrift.
They are faced with an array of seven unprioritized factors that more or less
summarize the many policies that scholars critical of the First Restatement and its
vested-rights thinking had identified as relevant to choice of law.'
That's the good news abouttheSecondRestatement'schoice-of-law methodology.
It gets a lot worse. Rather than leave judges entirely to their own devices to figure out
the state of most significant relationship, the Second Restatement in many instances

6. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supranote 1, § 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b)the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
The statement of the most-significant-relationship test in the contracts chapter takes a very
similar form. See id. § 188.
7. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement ofConflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 430-32 (2000).
8. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supranote 1, § 6(2) lists the following factors as "relevant to

the choice of the applicable rule of law":
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
According to comment c to § 6, "it is not suggested that the factors mentioned are listed in the
order of their relative importance. Varying weight will be given to a particular factor, or to a
group of factors, in different areas of choice of law."
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offers them guidance in the form of more specific rules. Typically, these rules
establish a presumption that one or another state furnishes the applicable law.' In
effect, that state is identified as the one of most significant relationship subject to
reassessment based on full-scale application of the most-significant-relationship test.
In the abstract, that may sound like a fairly helpful and promising approach. The
particular presumptive rules adopted, however, frequently bear a striking and rather
frightful resemblance to the territorial rules that the Second Restatementpurported to
lay to rest. Indeed, it is positively stunning to see the much criticized place-of-wrong
rule-the rule whose illogic spurred the first overtjudicial breaks with the traditional
rules' 0-rise from the ashes to take on the status of a presumptive rule in section after
section of the chapter on torts."'
The disinterment of the ostensibly "superseded" FirstRestatementrules is perhaps
most starkly on display in the Second Restatement's treatment of real property. The
chapter on property begins with a statement of the most-significant-relationship test
as "the general principle" for"property in general."' 2 The black-letter rules pertaining
to real property that follow, however, make clear that the drafters did not intend for
courts in deciding real property questions to puzzle over which state is the one of
most significant relationship. Dispensing with presumptions, the drafters embraced
in one rule after another the First3Restatement dogma that questions of real property
are the domain of the situs state.
II. Two ISENOUGH
My misgivings about the Second Restatement do not end with the criticisms offered
above. For present purposes, however, I see no need to pursue the matter here.
Although I believe the Second Restatement is seriously flawed, I do not think the
American Law Institute should begin work to replace it with a third. 4 Whatever the

9. See, e.g., id. § 146 (parties' rights and liabilities in personal injury action are
determined by law of state where injury occurred unless, as to specific issue, another state has
more significant relationship); id. § 199(2) (contract usually will be upheld with regard to
formalities if it satisfies requirements of place of execution).
10. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Griffith v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
11. See, e.g., SECOND REsTATEMENT, supra note I, § 146 (discussed supra note 9); id. §
156 (law of state where injury occurred will usually determine whether actor's conduct was
tortious); id. § 175 (parties' rights and liabilities in wrongful death action are determined by
law of state where injury occurred unless, as to specific issue, another state has more
significant relationship).
12. See id. § 222.
13. See, e.g., id. § 223 (validity and effect of conveyance of interest in land are determined
by law that courts of situs state would apply); id. § 236 (intestate succession to land is
determined by law that courts of situs state would apply).
14. A separate question is whether the Second Restatement should simply be repealed,
leaving a vacuum in the area as far as restatements. Although I confess I would not be
heartbroken if this came to pass, Ifind it almost inconceivable that the American Law Institute
could be persuaded to make such a move. Particularly given current space limitations, I will
not attempt here to address seriously the case for a simple repeal.
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shortcomings of the SecondRestatement,I am persuaded that a third is almost certain
to be worse.
My principal concern about a third restatement is that it will have more rules and
they will be more rigid. The reporter for the Second Restatement, Willis Reese,
regarded the Second as a transition document. 5 His account of the Second
Restatemententerprise bears directly on my concern. According to Professor Reese,
Cook, Lorenzen, and others had succeeded by the early 1950s in exposing the
shallowness ofthe FirstRestatementrules and the vested-rights philosophy informing
them. 6 Yet, although the "need for a complete revision" had become "apparent,"' 7
it was difficult to state with any specificity a new set of widely shared principles that
might go into a Second Restatement. Conflicts scholars critical of the First
Restatement were hardly united in their thinking on the direction that courts should
follow, and the case law handed down in an era dominated by the FirstRestatement
understandably did not yield more than general insights into alternative, emerging
principles. 8 As a result, although (at least in Reese's view) choice of law ideally is
governed by "a large number of relatively narrow rules that will be applicable only
in precisely defined situations," 9 the Second Restatement's drafters generally settled
for rules of a more "fluid and uncertain" nature.2' The "task of future Restatements,"
however, would be to state "more definite and precise rules."'"
Perhaps Reese's vision for a third restatement would not carry the day, but I think
there is a high probability that it would. Certainly Dean Symeonides is ready to lead
the charge,22 and I anticipate he would have plenty of company. Explaining the
impulse behind the First Restatement's "over-simplified character," Reese wrote:
"[I]t is in the nature of men to seek certainty and simplicity in the law."' Reese made
two good points here, one intentionally and the other not. First, in the course of
prescribing legal norms, a great many people evidence an unmistakable yearning for
certainty and simplicity. Such yearning is particularly transparent in the rules of the
FirstRestatement, but it is also obviously at work in numerous Second Restatement

15. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963) [hereinafter Reese, Conflict of Laws]; Willis L.M. Reese, The
Second Restatement of Conflict ofLaws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV. 501 (1983) [hereinafter

Reese, The Second Restatement].
16. See Reese, Conflict of Laws, supra note 15, at 679-80.
17. Id. at 680.

18. See id. at 680-8 1.
19. Id. at 681.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 699; see also Reese, The Second Restatement, supra note 15, at 517-19. For
criticism of the Second Restatement project virtually from start to finish, see Professor
Ehrenzweig's thoughtful and lively series of articles on the subject-for example, Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its HistoricalPerspective:Should the RestatementBe
"Continued"?, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Restitution in the
Conflict ofLaws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1298
(1961); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
22. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
Proposalfor Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437 (2000).
23. Reese, Conflict of Laws, supra note 15, at 680.
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rules. If the past is any guide, there is good reason to expect this yearning to play a
major role in the drafting of a third restatement.
Second, as Reese inadvertently acknowledged by his reference to the "nature of
men" 4-- a reference no doubt intended to be understood in a gender-neutral way-the
drafting of the first two Restatements was a distinctly male exercise. In each instance,
those selected to serve as the reporter or associate reporter or as one of the dozen or
so advisers were all men.25 Presumably the American Law Institute would be sure not
to follow this pattern today. However, particularly given the relative numbers of men
and women currently doing conflicts scholarship, it would be quite surprising if the
drafting of a third restatement did not remain very much in male hands. If so, and if
feminists are right that men tend to be more rule-oriented than women, less concerned
about preserving flexibility and attention to context,26 it seems especially likely that
the third restatement's drafters will demonstrate the affinity for certainty and
simplicity that Reese ascribed to "the nature of men."
In part I am troubled by the prospect of a third restatement with "more definite and
precise rules" because I anticipate that the particular rules adopted simply will not be
very good. Reese expressed confidence that sound, relatively narrow rules would
evolve out of more judicial experience with the new thinking in choice of law.27
However, if the set of rules forged by the New York Court of Appeals in Neumeier
v. Kuehne-" and Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.29 are a fair guide as to the
type of precedent-conscious rules that a new restatement would incorporate, Reese's
confidence seems ill-founded." Even aside from its undue attention to territorial
factors, this distinctive judicial effort at rulemaking is highly problematic, and it is
no wonder that other courts have not rushed to devise rules of their own.' Ultimately,

24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at v (listing reporter, associate reporter, and
15 advisers); FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at iii (listing reporter and I1 advisers).
Anyone skeptical about whether the absence of women affected the drafting of the
Restatements need look no further than the heading for Topic 3 of the Second Restatement's
chapter on domicile (ch. 2), which quite remarkably groups together "Married Women, Infants,
Incompetents."
26. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, Moral OrientationandMoral Development, in WOMEN AND
MORAL THEORY 19 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987); NEL NODDINGS,
CARING: AFEMININE APPROACHTO ETHICsAND MORAL EDUCATION 2-3,36-37 (1984); SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 93-97 (1989).

27. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice ofLaw: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315,
323-25 (1972); Reese, Conflict ofLaws, supra note 15, at 681, 699.
28. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
29. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
30. Reese, however, would probably disagree. Writing the year before the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Neumeier, Reese commented that the rules that Chief Judge Fuld had
proposed in his concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969)-rules
that a majority of the Court of Appeals would soon adopt inNeumeier-were"the sort of rules
at which the courts should aim." Willis L.M. Reese, ChiefJudge Fuldand Choice ofLaw, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 548, 562 (1971).

3 1. For detailed criticism of the rules, see Gary J. Simson, The Neumeier-Schultz Rules:
How Logical a "Next Stage in the Evolution ofthe Law" After Babcock?, 56 ALB. L. REv. 913
(1993).
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I think Reese had a faith in the logical evolution of the common law that I do not
share. At bottom, I am far more skeptical about any enterprise that reasons strongly
from what courts are doing to what they should be doing.
Beyond my concern about the particular rules that the drafters ofa third restatement
would be likely to enshrine, I am simply troubled by any project that seeks to govern
choice of law by rules rather than an approach. Given space limitations, this is not the
place for me to elaborate upon my position in the rules-or-approach debate that has
raged among conflicts scholars in recent years.3 2 For present purposes, suffice it to
say that I do not believe that the benefits of greater consistency and less judicial
subjectivity promised by choice-of-law rules justify the costs exacted in terms of
sensitivity to context and fairness in individual cases. The Second Restatement is
already much too rule-oriented for my taste, and I see a third restatement as heading
further down a road best avoided to begin with.

III. A PROPOSED APPROACH
Undoubtedly one reason why I am not more receptive to choice-of-law rules is that
I have in mind a particular approach that promises to deliver benefits of the sort
anticipated from rules without exacting similar costs. By the same token, one reason
why I am not more willing to take my chances on a third restatement is that the
Second allows considerable room for the operation of this approach. Although I
believe that this approach, which I set forth in a prior article,33 is preferable to
restatement-type rules, I also think it can serve a useful function as an ingredient of
the Second Restatement methodology. As I will discuss in Part IV, the Second
Restatement's most-significant-relationship test can reasonably be interpreted to
authorize application of my approach, and courts that rely on the Second Restatement
would do well to so interpret the test. A major reservation that I have about a third
restatement and its likely quest for "more definite and precise rules" is that the mostsignificant-relationship test and the possibilities that it offers for applying my
proposed approach might well disappear.
Since I spelled out my approach and its logical underpinnings in detail when I first
proposed it, I will only highlight its principal features here. It consists of three basic
steps:
1. Ascertain whether any state has a greater interest in determining the
outcome of the case at hand than the forum state.
2. If so, make the choice(s) of law that a court sitting in the foreign state and
applying that state's conflicts law would make.
3. If not, apply forum law with regard to each issue in the case unless:
a. The foreign elements in the case bring into play a policy that would not

32. For a sense of the range of views in that debate, see Reese, supra note 27; Robert A.
Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a
Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 208-16 (1977); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts,
69 B.U. L. REV. I, 6-23 (1989).
33. See Gary J. Simson, Plotting the Next "Revolution" in Choice ofLaw: A Proposed
Approach, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279 (1991).
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be materially implicated if the case were confined in its elements to the
forum state;
b. Such policy militates strongly in favor of a choice of nonforum law; and
c. The policy preference expressed in the forum state's internal law is not so
strong as to belie the possibility that the forum state's 3lawmakers
could
4
intend it to yield to another policy in a multistate case.

Basically, Step 1 asks the court to identify the jurisdiction that should have authority
to determine the outcome of the case. Steps 2 and 3 tell the court how to give effect
to its Step I choice ofjurisdiction.
Step I is based on a policy of maximizing long-term enforcement of the forum
state's interests, and it seeks to effectuate that policy by enforcing a forum-state
interest unless another state has a greater interest. Like Brainerd Currie's highly
influential "governmental interest analysis" approach," Step I focuses on state
interests. It departs very significantly from Currie's approach, however, in the type
of interests that it regards as relevant. While the Currie approach seeks to ascertain
states' interests in applying the policies behind their internal laws, 36 Step I examines
states' interests in determining the outcome of the case. Moreover, while the Currie
approach determines the existence of a state interest by whether application of an
internal-law policy would benefit the residents of the lawmaking state,37 Step I does
so by whether the outcome would affect the welfare of the state's residents.
The advantages of the Step I definition of interests over the Currie definition are
two-fold. First, it adopts a much more inclusive and realistic view of the state
interests actually at issue in conflicts cases. States may have an interest in applying
not only their own internal laws but also (for reasons such as protecting expectations)
other states' internal laws. By the same token, they may have an interest in applying
their internal laws not only to benefit local residents but also (for reasons of fairness
and morality) to disadvantage them. Implicitly, Step I encompasses this full range of
potential interests.
Second, the Step I definition calls for a judicial inquiry that is much more
manageable and concrete. While the Currie approach asks courts to identify the
policies that prompted adoption of the conflicting internal laws, Step I focuses their
attention on the considerably less elusive question of whether the outcome ofthe case
will affect a state's residents.3"

34. See id. at 279. My approach takes as a given the view, reflected ingoverning Supreme
Court precedent, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not a substantial limitation on choice
of law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Shreve, supra note 2, at 275. If
the Court were to adopt the much stronger conception of full faith and credit that I proposed
in Simson, supranote 2, at 66-80, my approach would have to be slightly revised. See Simson,
supra note,31, at 928 n.56.
35. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
36. See id. at 183-84.
37. See id. at 85-87.
38. At times a court committed to investigating all possible effects on residents might find
this question quite onerous to answer. A forceful argument can be made, however, that a court
should be guided strongly, and perhaps exclusively, by the effects on the parties before the
court. See Simson, supra note 33, at 284-87. Under this thinking, a court with rare exception
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Step 2 deals with the situation in which the Step 1 choice ofjurisdiction points to
a foreign state as the selected jurisdiction. It calls on the court to respect the foreign
state's decisionmaking authority by applying that state's choice-of-law methodology
as if it were sitting in that state.
Step 3 addresses the situation in which Step 1 points to the forum state as the
selected jurisdiction. It features a presumption in favor of forum law, based on the
view that the natural advantages of applying forum law are always sufficiently great
to warrant choosing forum law absent a strong justification for doing otherwise. Step
3 also specifies three conditions that, if all met, would constitute such ajustification.
The Step 3 conditions seek to identify multistate contexts in which the forum state
would strike a different policy balance than the one reflected by forum law. The
foreign elements in a conflicts case may implicate a policy that would not be
materially implicated if the case had no out-of-state elements. If one assumes that
lawmakers focus on intrastate situations in formulating local law, then such a policy
presumably did not play an important part in the formulation of forum law. If that
policy militates strongly in favor of choosing foreign law in a particular case, and if
the policy preference reflected in forum law is not so strong as to belie the possibility
that the state's lawmakers could intend it to yield to another policy in a multistate
case, Step 3 recognizes that a court would sensibly choose nonforum law.
Finally, in considering the Step 3 conditions, courts would do well to pay special
attention to two policies: protecting justified expectations; and serving the needs of
the interstate and international systems. These policies appear to be much more likely
than any others to overcome the Step 3 presumption in favor of forum law. On the
other hand, a court considering the Step 3 conditions should pay no attention to
whether nonforum law appears in some sense to be "better" than forum law. As I
indicated in setting out my approach and recently explained in greater detail, attention
in choice of law to a better-law factor
raises serious and, in my view, insuperable
39
policy and constitutional difficulties.
IV. WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM

As indicated at the start of Part III, I believe that courts that rely on the Second
Restatementwould improve the quality of their decisions by using my approach in
applying the most-significant-relationship test. The considerations that my approach
takes into account fit comfortably within the section 6 list of factors relevant to choice
of law. Indeed, for me, unlike Professors Juenger and Weinberg, 0 that list's omission

should be able to identify the selected jurisdiction under Step I simply by looking to the
parties' states of residence. Thus, in general: if a plaintiff and defendant reside in the same
state, the court would identify that state as the selected jurisdiction; if one resides in the forum
state and the other elsewhere, the forum state would be the selected jurisdiction; and if they
reside in different foreign states, both of those states would be selected jurisdictions. For
discussion of how a court should deal with this latter situation of two selected jurisdictions, see
id. at 289. As to how my approach should be applied in a case with more than two parties, see
id. at 284 n.14.
39. See id. at 296-97; Gary J. Simson, Resistingthe Allure ofBetter Rule ofLaw, 52 ARK.

L. REv. 141 (1999).
40. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 415-16
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of a better-law factor was a wise decision and presents no problem at all. Concededly,
my approach gives a structure and organization to the section 6 factors that the
Second Restatement does not itself provide. However, it is not apparent why that
renders my approach and the most-significant-relationship test at all incompatible.
I also suggest that courts that look to the Second Restatement would do well to
focus on the most-significant-relationship test rather than the more specific rules
intended to guide the determination of which state is the one of most significant
relationship. In a recent article, Patrick Borchers empirically showed that courts
purporting to follow the Second Restatement commonly apply the most-significantrelationship test even when more particularized tort and contract rules are in point.4
Unlike Dean Borchers,4 2 I am delighted to see this pattern emerge, and I encourage
courts to accentuate it. Applied in the manner that I have proposed, the mostsignificant-relationship test offers much brighter prospects for conflicts justice than
either the Second Restatement's more specific rules or the even narrower rules that
a third restatement is apt to bring.

(2000); Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevisionofthe Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475,
497-501 (2000).
41. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations and an EmpiricalNote, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1240-46 (1997).
42. See id. at 1246-47.

